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"Pianos in the Woods":
Emily Dickinson's Imaginative Vision

Steven Schindler
David Walker, Adviser
May 1, 1980

After the final no there comes a yes
And on that yes the future world depends.
No was the night. Yes is this present sun.
If the rejected things, the things denied,
Slid over the western cataract, yet one,
One only, one thing that was firm, even
No greater than a cricket's horn, no more
Than a thought to be rehearsed all day, a speech
Of the self that must sustain itself on speech,
One thing remaining, infallible, would be
Enough. Ah! douce campagna of that thing!
Ah! douce campagna, honey in the heart,
Green in the body, out of a petty phrase,
Out of a thing believed, a thing affirmed:
The form on the pillow humming while one sleeps,.
The aureole above the hummi~g house ...
It can never be satisfied, the mind, never.
Wallace Stevens, "The Well Dressed Man
With a Beard"

Finding is the first Act
The second, loss,
Third, Expedition for
The "Golden Fleece"
Fourth, no Discovery-Fifth, no Crew-Finally, no Golden Fleece-Jason--sham--too.

In this emphatically skeptical poem, Emily Dickinson
squarely connects with one of the central issues of romantic
and modern literature: the individual's alienation from the
world in which he lives.

This ontological separation had

its origins in modern thought in the philosophy of Descartes
and Hobbes, and was invested with scientific certainty by
the revelation of Newtonian physics.

Materialism gave way

to mechanism, and the universe was reduced to substance and
motion; it was emptied of purpose and value, and was thus
seen as separate from the vital world of private experience.
Inheritors of this world-view, the Romantics turned to the
unifying force of the imagination.

Through the power of

imaginative vision, they sought to heal the breach between
subject and object, and find a meaningful connection between
man and the universe.
By engaging the external world imaginatively, the Romantics hoped to discover the "One Life" that they believed
was in everything.

The natural world was thought to be

symbolic, the "signature" of a unified spiritual reality.
Tn his essay, "Nature," Emerson observes: "Every natural fact

-2-

is a symbol of some spiritual fact.

Every appearance in

nature corresponds to some state of mind, and that state
of the mind can only be described by presenting that natural
appearance as its picture."

Similarly, in a note to! the

"Intimations Ode," Wordsworth writes, "I was often unable
to think of external things as having external existence,
and I communed with all that I saw as something apart from,
but inherent, in my own immaterial nature."

It was precisely

this correspondence that Dickinson eschewed; she rejected
any not-..ions of a transcendental order, and embraced the world
as she learned to see it--a world moving and changing in the
flux of time and experience.

The universe was chaotic,

and any theories of unity were merely egoistic projections
of the human disposition to order experience.

The "loss" of

the "second act" is the loss of certitude that arises from
the rejection of a homocentric, unified vision of the universe; and the "Expedition for/The

'I

Golden Fleece'" is a

quest for a poetry of perception that describes the mind
engaging "things as they are.,,2

It is, in Robert Langbaum' s

words, "a poetry dealing with the object and the eye on the.
object.,,3

Viewed in this way, Emily Dickinson is a poet

who shares some of the same concerns that form the discourse
of much of Wallace Stevens' poetry.

I will attempt to explore

these ideas as they occur in Dickinson's poetry, using
Stevens as an aide to understanding them.

-3One of the targets of Dickinson's skepticism is religious dogmatism--a "narcotic" that seeks to "still the Tooth/
That nibbles at the soul"(501).

Religion is an''eclipse''

interposing between herself and reality.

Describing her

family to Thomas Higginson, she writes, "They are religious-except me--and address an Eclipse, every morning--whom they
call their 'Father'''(L.261).4

This ironic jab at the anth-

ropomorphic projection of "Father" that allows us to conceptualize the unknown, is developed in her poetry:
Those--dying then,
Knew where they went-They went to God's Right Hand-That Hand is amputated now
And God cannot be found-(1551)
Using the common metaphor of "God's Right Hand," and extending
it to its logical and absurd extreme, the poet rejects both
the rigid beliefs of religion and the stale patterns of language that "eclipse" reality.
Dickinson recognizes that as our awareness of disorder
increases and becomes more threatening, our "Blessed rage
for order"(CP, 130) gets stronger.

But she persistently

rejects the "avarice of the mind"(1682) that seeks to tame
*-h e. 01

the "Giants" of the unknown by "containing" 'i-t-. in its logic:
Brief struggle for capacity
The power to contain
Is always as the contents
But give a Giant room
And you will lodge a Giant
And not a smaller man
( 1286)
Dickinson was not unaware of the conflict that this posture
raises for the poet who must conceptualize to express herself,

-4and who must "contain Giants" in a system of patterned language.

This paradox is dramatized in one of her most awe-

some poems:
I felt a Funeral, in my Brain,
And Mourners to and fro
Kept treading--treading--till it seemed
That Sense was breaking through-And when they all were seated,
A Service, like a Drum-Kept beating--beating--till I thought
My Mind was going numb-And then I heard them lift a Box
And creak across my Soul
With those same Boots of Lead, again,
Then Space--began to toll,
As all the Heavens were a Bell,
And Being, but an Ear,
And I, and Silence, some strange Race
Wrecked, solitary, here-And
And
And
And

then a Plank in Reason, broke,
I dropped down, and down-hit a World, at every plunge,
Finished knowing--then-(280)

Funerals are a source of comfort for mourners who must come
to terms with death.

Through this ritual we attempt to

mitigate the force of one of the greatest unknowns we confront.

But for the poet, the funeral is an imposition of

reason, a false idea of order that does not comfort, but
rather, is the source of unbearable pain.

The central

metaphor of the "Funeral" becomes analagous to "Reason"
when we realize (in the last stanza) what "Sense" has
finally broken through.

The function of funerals is to im-

pose order on a terrifying experience, just as "reason" must

-5construct a coherent picture of reality from a bombardment of random sensations.
But although funerals9 and) analogously, reason are
a source of pain as they attempt to resist the pressures
of reality, an escape from an ordering consciousness to
a state of mere "Being" is just as frightening.
is no longer ordered in space.

Matter

Substance is spatialized,

and space is localized so "Space--began to toll,/As all
the Heavens were a Bell."
sense of vertigo.

This conflation creates an alarming

The absence of an ordering consciousness

not only causes a loss of balance; it results in the end of
"knowing" and of language.

When all order breaks down, and

"knowing" ends, the syntactical order of language disintegrates.
The location of the last word, "then)' is ambiguous; it can
can be placed either at the end of the preceding phrase or
at the beginning of one that might follow, but without the
familiar patterns of language we are unable to be sure.
The ambiguous placement of "then" suggests that to
have "Finished knowing" is both a beginning and an end.
The terror of mere "Being" forces us to recognize that we
cannot know the world immediately; instead, we begin to
realize that the world we see is mediated through an ordering
mind.

There is a dichotomy, not a unity, of mind and matter.

To live without acknowledging the externality of the natural
world--its randomness) and its indifferentrand often unknowable qualities--is to live with "Funerals in our Brains."
But to escape from an ordering consciousness is to experience

-6an unbearable sense of vertigo.

Dickinson accepts this

dichotomy, and explores the complex interaction between
the mind and the external world in a poetry of perception.
Any meaningful engagement of reality can only occur
after we discard all false beliefs and the stale language
that perpetuates them.

Ironically, when we are able to

penetrate the "eclipse" of dogma, we find there is no
light; there is only an existential darkness.

Dickinson's

hero does not seek an "igpis fatuus"(1551) to provide light
in a dark world; she accepts this darkness, and copes by
adjusting her "Vision to the Dark":
We grow accustomed to the Dark-When Light is put away-As when the Neighbor holds the Lamp
To witness her Goodbye-A Moment--We uncertain step
For newness of the night-Then--fit our Vision to the Dark-And meet the Road--erect--

(419)
Although we face initial uncertainties when we put away the
\

"Light," we emerge with a fresh vision of the world, and
are able to "meet the Road," to confront "things as they
are'," as Stevens puts it in "The Man with the Blue Guitar."
Stevens uses a similar metaphor to expresS the need to
adopt a skeptical response to the false lights that interpose between ourselves and reality:
Throwaway the lightVs, the definitions,
And say of what you see in the dark
That it is this or that,
But do not use the rotted names.
(CP, 183)

-7Like Stevens' "Man with the Blue Guitar," Dickinson's hero
cannot know "things exactly as they are"; that is Ita tune
beyond us"(CP, 165).

Even when we adjust our sight to "Mid-

night," we do not see perfectly--"Life steps almost straight."
The human condition of not knowing "things exactly as
they are" does not detract from the wonder of "things:as
they ar~I--a universe that is beautiful without our projections of passion and purpose.

This "Wonder" is a

condition to be savored: "Wonder--is not precisely Knowingj
And not precisely Knowing not--/A beautiful but bleak condition/He has not lived who has not felt--"(13.31).

This

"beautiful but bleak condition" describes the poet who
gazes on the northern lights:
Of Bronze--and Blaze-The North--Tonight-So adequate--it forms-So preconcerted with itself-So distant--to alarms-An unconcern so sovereign
To Universe, or me-Infects my simple spirit
With Taints of Majesty-Till I take vaster attitudes-And strut upon my stem-Disdaining Men, and Oxygen,
For Arrogance of them-( 290)

The speaker confronts the natural world in one of its most
awesome and sublime moments.

Like Stevens' autumn aurora

(liThe Auroras of Autumn"), it is a perfect symbol for the
ambiguity and evanescence of reality.

It exists apart from

us: it is "sovereign" and "unconcerned."
it, we connect with it.

But in contemplating

The "Taints of Majesty" that "in-

fect" the speaker are a resultl\her discovery of the profound

-8beauty in "things as they are."
symbol; they just are.

These lights are not a

Stevens describes the phenomenon

in similar terms:
So, then, these lights are not a spell of light,
A saying out of a cloud, but innocence.
An innocence of the earth and no false sign
Or symbol of malice.
(CP, 418)

In a moment of transport, Dickinson's observer feels
a sense of harmony with the blazing sky, and is able to
transcend the mundane world of "Men and Oxygen."

But

this transcendence is transitory, a moment in the mind;
she cannot ''strut upon her stem" too long:
,My Splendors, are Menagerie-But their Competeless Show
Will entertain the Centuries
When I, am long ago,
An Island in dishonered Grass-Whom none but Beetles--know.
( 290)

The poet is conscious that her mortality separates her from
the universe, but that through her art, she will achieve a
form of immortality.

The splendors of her art, though not

negligible, are small compared to the splendors of the sky.
"Menagerie" is the perfect word to describe this: it represents the exotic creatures of the world, caged in the
formal structure of poetry.

She receives her inspiration

from the evanescent colors of the sky, holds them together
in her mind, and gives them form in her verse.

Her poetry--

ThE.

v

like the scholar's single candle in "Auroras of Autumn"-lJ

pales in the "ArVtic effulgence

t"

but its "Competeless Show"

-9is not extinguished:
~
The scholar of one candle sees
An A~tic effulgence flaring on the frame
Of everything he is.
(CP, 417)

Although Dickinson's skeptical posture drove her to
examine "things as they are," conteJorary philosophy caused
her to question her ability to apprehend reality in its
naked state.

Summarizing the Critique of Pure Reason,

Bertrand Russell writes:
According to Kant, the outer world causes only
the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time,
and supplies the concepts by means of which we
understand experience. Things in themselves,
which are the causes of our sensations, are
unknowable; they are not in space and time,
they are not substances, nor can they be described by any of those other general concepts
which Kant calls "categories." Space and time
are sub j ective they are part of our apparatus
of perception. 5
In a letter to Higginson, Dickinson writes, "While my
thought is undressed--I can make the distinctions, but
when I put them in the Gown--they look alike, and numb"
(L.261).

This statement reveals a major poetic dilemma,

and it implies something about the nature of perception
that informs much of Dickinson's poetry.

Taken on a literal

level, she is expressing the frustrations of the poet who
recognizes the problems of faithfully rendering the beauty
of the phenomenal world, whose salient qualities are flux
and evanescence, in a sy\em of patterned language: "You
cannot fold a Flood--/And put it in a drawer" (530) .

But

implicit in this statement is a paradox that directs our
attention to the problems of perception and poetic expression

-10that Dickinson explores in her poetry: since we can neither
see nor express a naked thought, we dress it in metaphor,
and in doing so, impose our subjective process of cognition
on the objective world, refracting its contours through our
own minds.
In one poem, Dickinson squarely confronts the process
of perception and its epistemological implications:
Perception of an object costs
Precise the Object's loss-Perception in itself a Gain
Replying to its Price-The Object Absolute--is nought-Perception setsLit fair
And then Upbraids a Perfectness
That si tua te s so far-.-

(1°71)
The poet concedes that we see the world through a subjective
lens; thus, "the Object Absolute--is nought."

The speaker

is aware that the nature of perception is such that it
prevents us from accurately mapping the contours of an
objective landscape; but rather than lamenting her inability
to apprehend the "Object Absolute," she celebrates "gain":
her ability to be, in Stevens' words, the "single artificer
of the world/In which she sings" (CP, 129).
The poet does not choose sides in the epistemological
,y'

debate of wheter mind or matter is prior and creative; instead she recognizes that it is the complexity of their
interaction that forms the content of experience, and is
the source of art.

The phenomenal world alone is devoid

of beauty without a human perceiver--it is "nought."

But

neither is the poem an egoistic rampage: it is through the

-11-

act of perception that we realize how unknowable the external world is, "situated so far" from our own minds.
Perception and language are the forces that enable
the poet to invigorate our sense of reality, cutting through
the "eclipse" of the absolute labels we assign to the "objects"
of our experience.

These rigid qualities that resist change

are represented in the poem as "absolute" and "perfectness."
With linguistic precision, Dnckinson defrocks two mighty
superlatives.

The 'Object Absolute" is complete, whole,

and not dependent on anything else (including the mind).
"Absolute" bestows upon the "Object" a title with implicit,
unlimited powers--an absolute ruler.
absolute--absolutely nothing.

But "nought" is another

The juxtaposition creates a

linguistic type of destructive interference.

The "Object"

remains "Absolute," but it is emptied of any meaning, and
its royal posture appears silly and pompous.
In the second instance, it is essential to notice
Dickinson's idiosyncratic noun.;..form of the adjective "perfect."

"Perfection" is the standard usage for something that

contains the quality of "perfect."

But "perfection" would

be too solid to be upbraided, even by perception.

"Upbraid

Perfection" rings futile--the pest of perception nudging up
against a mountain.

But "a Perfectness" is a bit more pliant:

the introduction of the indefinite article and the forced
suffix, "ness," which sounds like a loose appendage because
it cannot merge phonetically with its
its solidity.

root~

detracts from

This quality of being more "perfectish" than

-12"perfect" makes it a more plausible object to be upbraided;
it also carries a snide undertone so that, even before it is
chided, it shares a pejorative affinity with the "Object
Absolute"--a cold and sterile quality of the just-too-perfect.
Like the "Wonder" that "is not precisely Knowing/And
not precisely knowing not," our inability to apprehend reality
directly is not a cause for despair; it is a charm:
A Charm invests a face
Imperfectly beheld-The Lady dare not lift her Veil
For fear it be dispelled-But peers beyond her mask-And wishes--and denies-Lest Interview--annul a want
That Image--satisfies-(421)
That all knowledge is inferential is a justification rather
than an impediment for poetry.

With all transcendental notions

called into question, and our ability to know absolutely made
suspect, the moment of specific experience becomes the only
verity; in a moment of "vivid transparence" (as Stevens
describes it, CP, 380), the imagination engages the "Object
Absolute" and "sets it fair."

This places primary importance

on the imagination for providing this ideal union of the
imagination and reality, but we recognize (with the speaker
in 1071)\~ that this harmony is transitory, an "idea of or'"

der," rather than an existential one.
The primacy of the imagination is dramatized in the poem:
Who goes to dine must take his Feast
Or find the Banquet mean-The Table is not laid without
Till it is laid within.

-13For Pattern is the Mind bestowed
That imitating her
Our most ignoble Services
Exhibit worthier.
(1223)
The human mind is obsessed with pattern.

The natural world

holds a random assortment of food for our feast; the
imagination engages this disorder, perceives the possibilities
of pattern, and gives them aesthetic form.

This tremen-

dous discovery of "the possible" gives art a noble purpose: "The gleam of an heroic Act/Such strange illumination/
The Possible's slow fuse is lit/BY the Imagination"(1687).

The

imagination is a source of pleasure--"arranging, deepening,
and enchanting" (CP, 130) a disordered universe--as well as the
seat of our power over nature.
trdar~':;

It is our "Vision" in the

or, to use Stevens' phrase, it "helps us face the

dumbfounding abyss/Between us and the object"(CP, 437).
Dickinson explores the relationship between "us and
the object" in another poem:
The Outer--from the Inner
Derives its Magnitude-'Tis Duke, or Dwarf, according
As is Central Mood-The fine--unvarying Axis
That regulates the Wheel-Though Spokes--spin--more conspicuous
And fling a dust--the while.
(451)
The speaker calls our attention to the distance between
subject and object: the wheel of experience is in perpetual motion, spinning, and indifferently flinging dust

-14on the observing intelligence.

But the central metaphor

also illustrates the complexity of experience, in which
the human agent is both a part of, and separate from his
scene.

Although the "Inner" may enhance the "Outer," it

does not function without reference to it: it depends on
reality.
The imagination does not master reality by projecting
itself into it, but by abstracting from the "Outer" its
fictional possibilities--the "Duke" and "Dwarf."

These

fictions are transitory, varying "As is the Central Mood."
Like the poet's "Menagerie" in 290, these images illustrate
the possibilities as well as the limitations of the
they are exotic, but they are

~lso

real.

imaginati~n~

Stevens articulates

this balance between the imagination and reality in his
essay, "Three Academic Pieces".:
The imagination is able to manipulate nature
as by creating three legs and five arms but
it is not able to create a totally new nature
as, for instance, a new element with creatures
indigenous thereto, their costumes and cuisines.
Any discussion of level is a discussion of balance as well. Thus, a false exaggeration is
a disturbing of She balance between reality and
the imagination. ~
"Manipulation" is roughly equivalent to aesthetic perception.
In the same essay, Stevens writes that in poetry, "we are
not dealing with identity.

Both in nature and in metaphor

identity is the vanishing-point of resemblance."-s;r

In her

poetry of perception, Dickinson does not attempt to create
r

C-'r

a picture of the world, but rather,Vhow we patch it together
in our minds.

This process is explored in "Delight is as

-15the Flight":
Delight is as the flight-Or in the Ratio of it,
As the Schools would say-The Rainbow's way-A Skein
Flung colored, after Rain,
Would suit as bright,
Except that flight
Were Aliment-"If it would last"
I asked the East,
When that Bent Stripe
Struck up my childish
Firmament-And I, for glee,
Took Rainbows, as the common way,
And empty skies
The Eccentricity-And so with Lives--'
And so with Butterflies-Seen magic--through the fright
That they will cheat the sight-And Dower latitudes far on-Some sudden morn-Our portion--in the fashion-Done-(258)
The separation of the "Inner" from the "Outer" world begins in the first stanza which opens with the simile: -Delight is as the flight."

Readers who are familiar with

Dickinson's "naming" poems will recognize an almost familiar
syntactical form.

"'Heaven'--is what I cannot reach! "(239)

and "'Hope' is the thing with feathers--"(254) are typical
opening lines of poems in which the speaker gives a personalized definition for an abstract term.

She uses a

simple and powerful construction in which an abstract noun
that is already, by definition, colored by subjective.values,
is reduced to the poet's own terms.

This reduction, however,

-16is not to be found in the definition itself, which often
contains an undefined object that suggests ambiguity (lithe
thing with feathers"), but in the copula,· "is."

This

syntax implies a direct and logical connection between
subject and predicate, while the content reminds us of the
subjective nature of knowledge.

The intrusion of the com-

parati ve adverb, "as'," in "Delight is as the flight" is felt
as a deliberate hesitation of language and must have a measure
of significance.
Rewritten in Dickinson's "naming form," "Delight is the
flight" would seem to make sense in the. context of the first
stanza.

Delight is not in the colors of the rainbow (lithe

Skein/Flung colored, after Rain"), but rather, in its evanescence (tithe flight").

Indeed, if this were the sentiment

to be expressed, the hypothetical revision would seem to
make poetic sense; its form would make a closer, mimetic
gesture toward "flight" than does the actual first line.
What she does say, however, and what she means are organically
linked through form.

It might be paraphrased as, "Delight

is neither in the colors of the rainbow, nor in its flight;
but rather, in the ratio of its appearance to its disappearance."
The form of her statement is actually that which we commonly
use to express proportion in algebra: w is to x as y is to z.
Considered this way, delight is something that is exclusively
human: it is not merely the delight in nature's colors or
its evanescence; delight is in the patterns that we perceive
that may have their seeds in the external world, but have in

-17themselves, an existence apart from it.
There is a direct analogy made between the rainbow
and butterflies, and human beings; they are linked by
their shared quality of impermanence that is the source
of an elusive magic!
And so with Lives-And so with Butterflies-Seen--magic--through the fright
That they will cheat the sight-And Dower latitudes far on-Some sudden morn-Our portion--in the fashion-Done-The analogy is strengthened by attributing human qualities
to untpinking things which, lacking thought, malice, or
benevolence) can neither "cheat" nor "dower."

There is,

however, a subtle irony working to undercut the analogy
between subject and object.

This is achieved through the

rhythmic modulation that moves the stanza to the final
word,"done."

The first four lines communicate a spacious,

almost "magical" feeling: the repetition of the first
two lines, the word "magic" that is followed by a phrase
that achieves its fullest expansion on the word "Dower"
before taking off into "latitudes far on."

In both its

form and content, the passage expounds on the word "magic."
But when we share in nature's evanescence, the result
is less fanciful; maglc is a whimsical euphemism for death.
The syntax breaks down, and the stanza drops off "suddenly,"
and then expires in three short, last breaths, on the final
note of "done."

-18One critic writes of stevens' poetry, that "One
necessity of individual being, then, is mortality, and
another is subjectivity, for the mind is a specific of
time as well as a specific of existence or point of
identity from which all the world radiates."S

"Delight

is as the flight" addresses these two aspects of being.
The speaker recognizes that "the magic" of life is predicated on our ability to conceive of our own mortality.
(Dickinson writes elsewhere, "That it will never come
again/Is what makes life so sweet"(1741).)

It is this

conceiving self that is also the "point of identity"
from which "all the world radiates"; her subjectivity is
essential to the "magic": "Seen magic--through the fright/
That they will cheat the sight."

The magic is dependent

on the quality of the perceiving mind that filters
visual sensations through a complex of emotions and then
recognizes them as "magic"--a "magic" that exists within
the boundaries of the mind.
Again, Doggett's remarks are particularly apt for
this poem which dramatizes that "the moment of consciousness,
the unfolding event we call experience, including what
we think and what we feel as well as what we see, is
an infinitely complex realization of self and world.,,9
With all the poem's emphasis on the self, it is crucial
to note that this is a moment of specific experience.
The first and last stanzas lack a situational matrix,

-19and, as I have shown, describe not the world, but the
way the mind perceives it.

But the second stanza achieves

the balance between self and world by giving the poem
an experiential referent.

The second stanza shifts suddenly

into the past tense, and a youthful version of the speaker
addresses not

rainbow~

but a specific "Bent Stripe."

This locates the observations made in the first and last
stanzas more specifically in time.

The present tense

becomes more than the language of an abstract discourse;
it represents a specific time in the life of the speaker
whose remarks are more clearly understood when we recognize
that she is older and that her experience has changed
the way she perceives the natural world.

We can recognize

the contrast between the spontaneous "glee" that the
rainbows evoked for the child and the somber, reflective
mood of the last stanza.

The reader is able to observe

this specific experience as it unfolds in the speaker's
consciousness.

We trace a progression from a seemingly

abstract statement in the first stanza, to a specific
observation in the second, and finally, to a moment of
heightened consciousness when the speaker becomes more
fully aware of the complex relationship between herself
and the world.
Dickinson achieved her mastery over the natural
world through her mastery of language.

Perhaps the

greatest distinction we can make between her and her

-20contemporaries lies in her attitude toward language.
Unlike Emerson, for whom words were "signs of facts,"

10

Dickinson found in language the facts themselves.
Words were the source of the poet's power, allowing her
to create new meaning.

For her, like Stevens, "A poet's

words are of things that do not exist without the words."ll
Johnson's subject index in the Complete Poems lists
sixteen poems in which Dickinson writes specifically
about words.

She states her claim for the hidden powers

of language over our lives:
Could mortal lip divine
The undeveloped F~ght
Of a delivered syllable
'Twould crumble with the weight.
(1409)

She expresses a similar sentiment in a letter to Joseph
Lyman:
t"Je used to think, Joseph, when I was
an unsifted girl and you so scholarly that words were cheap and weak.
Now I don't know of anything so mighty.
There are [those] to which I lift my
hat when I see them sitting princelike among their peers on the page.
Sometimes I write one, and look at
his outli~2s till he glows as no
sapphire.-';r. ;'....u' :l

As R;'Sewall nicely observes, Dickinson achieves in her
poetry "the intensification, or concentration, of meaning
in words until they glowed 'as no sapphire. ,"13

This

"concentration of meaning" in words until they seem to
create their own meaning characterizes most of Dickinson's

-21-

"naming poems." . I will examine one:
"Heaven"--is what I cannot reach!
The Apple on the Tree-Provided it do hopeless--hang-That--"heaven" is--to Me!
The Color, on the Cruising Cloud-The interdicted Land-Behind the Hill--the House behind-There--Paradise--is found!
Her teasing P~rples--Afternoons-
The credulous~-decoy-Enamored of the Conjuror-That spurned us--Yesterday!

(239)
As in the other poems I've discussed, Dickinson makes
the "gap" between subject and object distinct: the objects
of the natural world are always one step beyond our "reach."
The distance between the poet and the "conjuror" provides
the tension in the poem; there is a "war," to use stevens'
apt phrase, "between the mind and sky"(CP, 407), and the
struggle for victory is the dynamic of the poem.
"war" begins in the first line.

This

The syntax of the sen-

tence implies the poet's mastery; "heaven" is defined in
her own terms.
that "heaven"

But the content of the line informs us
lies beyond the poet's words.

The poem

unfolds, an extended analogy, ironically linking a variety
of natural objects (that are characterized by their
....
elusiveness vis-a-vis the poet) to the speaker's term, "heaven."
The abundance of these objects reveals another tension:
the poet uses the singular form of the verb "to be,"
contrasting the human ability and disposition to perceive
the resemblances in an assortment of objects, and order
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them in symbolic language, with nature's randomness.
The process of naming is that of perceiving resemblance,
and it is through this process that the poet creates
new meaning, ultimately mastering the natural world.
Although the mind perceives harmony, the tension that
the poet maintains between the tenor and vehicle of
her extended metaphor,14 reminds us of the extent of
artifice, and consequently, of the fictional nature of
the harmony between subject and object.

Without denying

the externality of the natural world--its randomness and
elusiveness--she celebrates the imagination's capacity
to create order from chaos.
In his article, "The Structure of Romantic Nature
Imagery," W.K. Wimsatt describes a characteristic type
of romantic metaphor which is very different from the
type I have just described.

He writes that romantic

metaphor "makes less use of the central overt statements
of similitude" in which "both tenor and vehicle are
wrought in a parallel process.,,15

This is indicative

of the difference between Dickinson's imaginative vision
and that of the Romantics.

While the Romantics sought

an ideal union between man and the universe, Dickinson
insisted on the distinction, and in doing so, she placed
the locus of artistic creation in the mind of the artist:
a mind that was dependent on nature, but that in the end,
transcended it by creating its fictiohs out of the uniquely

-23human gift of language.

"The Golden Fleece," the imaginative transformation
of experience into artifice, was Dickinson's vision.
To achieve this, she found it necessary to somehow live
closer to experience.

This forced her to call into question

the dogmatic beliefs that interposed between her and reality.
The belief in either a theistic or transcendental order
f'-(>;""f.o

was to har a projection of the human need toV6rder onto a universe that was forever fleeing, enamoring her with its
evanescent beauty.

Her skepticism resulted in a loss of

certitude; it meant groping for a while in the "dark,"
searching for a new way to see.

This is the position of

"loss" from which her "expedition" begins.
A corollary to this "religious" skepticism was the
doubt raised by philosophers of our ability to apprehend
the "object absolute."

Our inability to participate

in a state of mere being where "knowing" ends and "bells
begin to toll" forced her to turn to the one thing she
could believe in: the moment of perception

when the imagin-

ation engages the world outside of it, "setting its
objects fair," liberating them from a state of disorder
by perceiving patterns and creating language.

This is

what the poet does; and much of Dickinson's poetry is
about writing poetry.
Dickinson loved a riddle, especially a tough one:

-24The Riddle we can guess
We speedily despise-Not anything is stale so long
As yesterday's surprise~(1222)
For her readers, Dickinson bequeathed the ultimate riddle:

1775 poems--moments of experience that often seem linked
only by their ambiguities and contradictions.

In reading

her poetry we participate in our own "Expedition," trying to
patch together a coherent pattern f~ her "competeless
show. "
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